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Abstract
This paper analyses the determinants of banks’ loan loss allowances for samples
of US banks and three non-US samples: a group of 21 countries, Canada and
Japan. The model includes fundamental (or non-discretionary) determinants of the
allowance such as non-performing loans, and discretionary determinants such as
income before the loan loss provision. The results suggest that the loan loss
allowance is sensitive to pre-provision income in almost all samples. However,
the results also suggest that some variables thought to reflect fundamental factors
in US analysis, such as net chargeoffs, are not significant factors for non-US
banks.
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Luottotappiovarauksiin vaikuttavat tekijät:
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Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan pankkien luottotappiovarauksiin vaikuttavia te-
kijöitä sekä yhdysvaltalaisista pankeista koostuvassa otoksessa että kolmessa
muussa otoksessa, jotka edustavat 21 maan ryhmää, Kanadaa ja Japania.
Tutkimuksessa käytetty malli käsittää sekä luottotappioihin vaikuttavat perus-
tekijät, kuten järjestämättömät luotot, että päätösperäiset tekijät, kuten pankin tuo-
tot ennen varauksia. Tulosten mukaan melkein kaikissa tutkituissa otoksissa
luottotappiovaraukset riippuvat pankin tuotoista ennen varauksia. Toisaalta tulos-
ten mukaan eräät sellaiset tekijät, joiden Yhdysvalloissa on katsottu johtuvan
perustekijöistä, eivät vaikuta merkitsevästi luottotappiovarauksiin muualla. Tällai-
sia ovat esimerkiksi järjestämättömien luottojen poistot.
Avainsanat: luottotappiovaraus, tilinpäätösstandardit, kansainvälinen pankkitoi-
minta, järjestämättömät luotot, harkinnanvaraiset jaksotukset
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How banks account for their loan and lease losses may have a large affect on their
reported earnings and capital. Many argue that the affect on capital is large that
Japanese banks have been economically insolvent for years and are able to report
positive accounting capital only because they refuse to fully recognize their
losses. The affect on earnings is so important that bank stock analysts routinely
discuss whether a bank has managed its loan loss accounting to help smooth
earnings or hit the current period’s earnings target. Wall and Koch (2000) survey
a number of papers on US banks’ loan loss accounting. While acknowledging that
the evidence is not completely consistent, they conclude that the weight of the
evidence suggests that banks are using loan loss accounting to manage earnings
and capital.
1
This paper extends a small empirical literature on accounting for impaired
loans by non-US banks by including an important determinant, non-performing
loans, and by comparing non-US banks with those in the US. Banks in other
countries have different accounting rules, different supervision and possibly
different incentives. Accounting rules have been set for each country by some
combination of national laws and pronouncements by accounting and bank
regulatory authorities. More recently, many banks outside the US are preparing
financial statements in accordance with standards set by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
2 Bank supervisors in some countries,
including the US, routinely conduct on-site examinations, but many other
supervisors do not. The differences in incentives may arise either because of
differences in incentive compensation or differences in the emphasis given by
market participants to quarterly earnings.
Do these differences in the rules and incentives result in different responses to
what have been considered the fundamental, or non-discretionary, determinants of
the loan loss allowance (LLA)? Do non-US banks use their loan loss accounting
to manage earnings or capital? If so, do they appear to have more or less
discretion?
Perhaps the biggest constraint on empirical analysis of loan loss accounting
by banks outside the US has been their relatively short history of reporting crucial
variables, such as non-performing loans, and the small number of banks in those
countries that have been providing full information. This study seeks to overcome
                                                
1 Papers on loan loss accounting by US banks include Moyer (1990), Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson
(1990), Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995), Collins,
Shackelford and Wahlen (1995), Bhatt (1996), Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1998), Kim and
Kross (1998), and Hasan and Hunter (1999), Kiridaran K., G.J. Lobo, D. Yang (2003).
2 Links to a history of the IASB may be found at < http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=
6864420&sc={0A3016DC-1255-4FFF-BE5A-B7698B3989BD}&n=89>.8
these limits by using three sources to examine both broad differences in loan loss
accounting across the world, and specific differences between the US and two
other countries: Canada and Japan.
The broad analysis uses data from the BankScope database. BankScope
provides some of the widest coverage of countries and banking organizations of
any available bank database. The set of banking organizations includes
consolidated statements of bank parents, and some subsidiaries. Unfortunately,
some of the variables required for this paper are not reported for many of the
banking organizations on BankScope and even where reported are only available
from 1993 to 2000. Nevertheless, 2620 observations from the US and 871
observations from 21 other countries are available.
In order to provide a narrower focus on individual countries, this study also
compares the US with Japan and Canada. The observations on Japan are obtained
by taking the 392 Japanese observations in BankScope and removing observations
if the bank is not headquartered in Japan leaving a final sample of 321
observations.
3 Japan is interesting because of the stress on its loan loss accounting
system from the prolonged and unusually large loan losses due to weakness in the
Japanese economy.
Canada has far fewer banks than does Japan, but its banks have a longer
history of reporting crucial loan quality information. Importantly, the data for the
Canadian banks are available online from various editions of the six largest
Canadian banks’ annual reports dating back to the mid-1990s.
4 The Canadian
sample is attractive because it provides a set of large banks with nationwide
franchises.
Given that BankScope includes subsidiary banks but the Japanese and
Canadian samples do not, the US comparison sample for these countries is
obtained from a source that includes only parent companies, Bank Compustat.
Those US banks smaller than the size of Canada’s sixth largest bank in 2000, $US
40 billion in assets, are deleted from the Canadian comparison sample.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section
summarizes the accounting process and principles followed by banks, and the next
discusses the basic empirical model. The following two sections discuss first the
data and results from comparison of US and non-Us banks and then from binary
                                                
3 This limits the sample to banks that are: a City Bank, a Trust Company, a Long-term Credit
Bank, a Regional Bank or a Member of the Second Association of Regional Banks. The lists of
banks are from the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan < http://www.dic.go.jp/english/
e_kikan/e_kikan.html > and Japanese Banks for various years published by the Federation of
Bankers Associations of Japan (Zenginkyo). Most of the observations are from the Regional Banks
and Second Association of Regional Banks.
4 These are the Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,
National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto Dominion Bank.9
comparisons of Japan and Canada with the US. The last section provides
concluding remarks.
2 Loan loss accounting
The accrual accounting rules under which banks operate require recognition of
revenue as it is earned and expenses as they are incurred, regardless of the timing
of the actual cash flows. The mechanical steps that banks follow in their loan loss
accounting are generally similar around the world and are relatively
uncontroversial. The principles that underlie the accounting, however, may differ
significantly and are definitely a source of ongoing controversy. The subsection
2.1 summarizes the mechanical steps. Subsection 2.2 summarizes the principles
set out by US and international accounting authorities, the views of bank
supervisory officials, and the important role of bank managers.
2.1 The procedure for loan loss accounting
Banks operating under US generally accepted accounting principals (GAAP)
follow a multi-step process to determine their allowance for loan and lease losses
(LLA). At the end of each accounting period, a bank determines the probable
value of the loan losses in its existing portfolio. The bank then debits its loan loss
expense (or provision) by an amount equal to the difference between its estimated
loan losses and the current balance in its LLA.
5 The offsetting credit increases the
bank’s LLA. The LLA is shown on the balance sheet as a reduction in the value of
its outstanding loans (in accounting terms, it is a contra-asset account). As the
period progresses, a bank will recognize that it is unlikely to collect the full value
of selected loans and charges off the portions of those loans that are unlikely to be
collected. As individual loans are charged-off, the offsetting entry is a reduction in
the LLA. In some cases, the bank will find that it can recover part or all of the
value of a loan that had been previously charged-off. The offsetting entry for these
recoveries is an increase in the LLA. The combined effect of charge-offs and
recoveries n the LLA is often simply referred to as charge-offs net of recoveries,
or net charge-offs. At the end of the period, the process repeats. The bank
compares the remaining value of its LLA with the losses in its existing portfolio.
                                                
5 A bank may decrease its LLA with a negative provision for loan losses, but this is rare. In order
for the required loan loss allowance to drop at the end of the year, a bank must find that the likely
recoveries on loans previously charged-off exceed the likely loan losses on newly impaired loans.10
Banks analyze loans for impairment on an individual basis where appropriate.
However, given the cost of individual analysis, many types of relatively
homogenous, small loans, such as credit card loans, are analyzed on a portfolio
basis.
The accounting procedures followed by banks headquartered outside the U.S.
follow the same basic steps. Perhaps the biggest procedural difference is that
many non-US banks divide their LLA into two parts: specific allowances (or
reserves) and general allowances (or reserves). As a bank concludes that
individual loans will not be recovered in full, it adds to its specific allowances.
The general allowance arises for groups of loans where the bank has not identified
impairment on any specific loan, but based on historical experience the bank
believes it likely that some part of the loan portfolio is impaired.
2.2 Principles of loan loss accounting
The principles underlying banks’ loan loss accounting are generally determined
by the GAAP in their home country. US accounting principles emphasize the
importance of accurately measuring a firm’s net income rather than conservatively
valuing a firm’s assets.
6 However, bank supervisors have taken the position that
banks must be allowed to maintain “prudent” reserves that are sufficient to offset
expected losses. Given their differences, the U.S. accounting authorities have had
ongoing discussions with supervisors about the correct application of GAAP.
7
Loan loss accounting has also received international attention from the
accounting authorities and bank supervisors. Many of these countries have
historically emphasized conservative valuation of assets over accurately
measuring each period’s net income. However, the creation of the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and its successor, the IASB, has started
many industrial countries outside the U.S. down the road towards a common set
of GAAP. The European Commission has proposed that all European Union firms
that are listed on a regulated exchange be required to prepare consolidated
financial statements in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS)
by 2005. The IASB has adopted standards for loan loss accounting that are
generally similar to US GAAP.
Bank supervisors have also come together internationally through the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (1998). The Basel Committee is similar to
                                                
6 US GAAP is set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board with oversight by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
7 Bank regulatory authorities include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. See Wall and Koch (2000) for a
review of the issues being discussed by the US accounting authorities and bank regulators.11
U.S. supervisors in arguing that bank safety and soundness requires that “the
accounting principles used by a bank reflect prudent and conservative valuations.”
While accountants and supervisors debate the merits of different standards,
the actual estimates of loan losses are determined by each bank’s management.
Bank managers must satisfy their accountants and supervisors that the estimates
are within acceptable bounds. However, the determination of when a bank should
recognize impairment of a loan and the measurement of the extent of loss is part
science and part art. This lack of definitive standards gives bank managers an
element of discretion over an item that may have a substantial impact on a bank’s
reported net income and equity capital.
3 Empirical analysis
The goal of empirical analysis in this paper is to determine whether managers use
their discretion to influence reported net income and equity. This task would be
simplified if banks announced what the value of their LLA would be absent the
use of managerial discretion; that is the latent, or (in parallel with the terminology
on accounting discretion) the non-discretionary value of LLA. However, given
that the non-discretionary value of the LLA is not disclosed, it must also be
estimated. Thus, the basic model takes the form:
it kit kt jit j 1 it D ND LLA           (3.1)
where
LLAit = loan loss allowance (reserves) for bank i at time t
Njit = the j
th non-discretionary determinants of the LLA for bank i at time t,
Dkit = the k
th discretionary determinants of the LLA for bank i at time t, and
εit = a random error.
The non-discretionary component of LLA may be proxied by variables reflecting
the level of losses in the loan portfolio. The best proxy is non-performing loans, or
loans on which the borrower is not current on payments, typically the borrower is
at least 90 days in arrears. One interpretation of the coefficient on non-performing
loans is that it estimates the proportion of non-performing loans that a bank
expects to lose. In a loan loss accounting system that distinguishes specific from
general reserves, this part of the estimation would roughly proxy for specific
reserves.
The second proxy, total loans, may be thought of as a way of capturing
general reserves. One interpretation of the coefficient on total loans is that it
estimates the proportion of seemingly good loans that the bank will lose.12
The coefficients on non-performing loans and total loans provide expected
losses averaged across the sample. A common way of capturing variations in this
expected loss rate is to the banks’ net charge-offs. All else equal, a bank with a
higher level of charge-offs is expected to suffer greater losses on its existing loans
and should have a larger LLA.
Bankers use their accounting discretion over LLA to move their earnings and
capital closer to the manager’s target values. Latent earnings and capital may be
proxied by their values before the incorporation of the current period’s loan loss
provision. As a first approximation, estimates of the target earnings and capital are
often treated as cross-sectional constants. A significant positive coefficient on
earnings indicates that banks with lower earnings reduce their LLA to help them
increase their earnings target. A positive coefficient on the earnings variable is
consistent with earnings smoothing.
Similarly, a positive coefficient on capital suggests that banks with lower
capital ratios reduce their LLA to increase their capital adequacy ratios. A
coefficient on capital that is not significantly positive need not signify that bank
manager would never use LLA to manage capital. The expected gain to boosting
capital may be very small once a bank attains sufficiently high accounting capital
adequacy ratios.
In any given year, a higher loan loss provision will result in a higher value for
LLA, and lower values for earnings and equity all else equal. To avoid this
spurious correlation, the proxies for earnings and equity must not include the
contemporaneous impact of the loan loss provision, a problem complicated by our
inability to observe the impact of the provision on contemporaneous expense for
taxes. This may be done with earnings by using net income before taxes and the
loan loss provision. However, in the case of equity, this must be done by using the
beginning of year value of equity.
Substituting in these proxies into equation (3.1) and adding year fixed effects,
the basic estimation equation becomes:
it it 1
it 2 1 t , i 1 it 3 it 3 it 2 1 it
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NPLit = the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets at time t,
NCOit = the ratio of net charge-offs over year t to total assets at time t,
LOANit = the ratio of total loans to total assets at time t,
ERi,t–1 = the equity to assets ratio for bank i at the end of the prior year,
RETNi,t = the ratio of net income before taxes and loan loss provisions to total
assets for bank i in period t, and13
Yit = year fixed effect variable that equals 1 if the observation is from year t and
zero otherwise.
While the use of a variety of proxies is necessary to conduct empirical analysis,
their use also complicates the interpretation of the results. In analyzing the
problems with these proxies, it helps to separate banks which are experiencing
asset quality problems that could generate supervisory problems from all other
banks.
If a bank’s latent equity capital is comfortably above supervisory capital
requirements, then its incentive to manage non-performing loans, total loans and
net charge-offs is rather small. Banks have little, if any, ability to increase non-
performing loans above their true level within the scope of accounting rules. A
bank can decrease its non-performing loans by lending sufficient money to a
problem borrower so that the borrower can keep current on prior loans. However,
doing so is likely to be costly as the bank must increase its exposure to the
borrower and forgo taking actions to collect on the prior loan. Thus, reported non-
performing loans are likely to approximate their true value for banks that are
comfortably above supervisory minimums. Such banks are also unlikely to distort
their reported total loans. Net charge-offs will vary across banks but this is more
likely to reflect variations in charge-off policies rather than an attempt to manage
LLA.
Managers of banks above their supervisory minimum may still manage their
reported earnings to boost their bonuses and the bank’s stock price. Banks may do
so in a variety of ways, including selling assets that have appreciated or
depreciated in value in order to be able to recognize the gain or loss in value in
their financial statements. In general, banks may be expected to use other earnings
management techniques to move reported net income in the same direction as they
use loan loss provisions. The one exception occurs when the bank sharply
increases its LLA. In this case, the bank may seek to boost current earnings and
offset the higher loan loss provisions by recognizing gains on appreciated assets.
Nevertheless, the sale of appreciated assets by the bank at a time when it is
boosting its LLA supports the hypothesis that bank executives manage earnings.
A healthy bank does not need to use its loan loss accounting to manage its
equity capital and attempting to do so may provoke an adverse supervisory
response. However, the lack of adequate controls for the equity capital target may
produce a spurious correlation. Banks with high charter value may select less
risky loan portfolios and higher equity capital levels to minimize their probability
of losing their charter. If so, then LLA may be negatively correlated with latent
capital.
Distressed banks may issue financial statements that substantially understates
the true extent of the banks’ losses and thereby overstates their earnings and
capital with supervisory approval. Kane (2000, p. 286) says “Bank initiated14
disnformation may be viewed as an interwoven series of cover stories to mask
financial weakness.”
8 Along with understating the LLA, another natural part of
the “interwoven cover” story is likely to be that of understating non-performing
loans. Over time, such understatement may boost the coefficient on non-
performing loans if the borrower becomes more insolvent through time. Banks
with lower capital may also have been hiding more problems, implying the need
for a larger LLA when the problems are finally recognized. Banks with severe
loan problems that also have unrealized asset gains have a strong incentive to
recognize those gains at the same time that they increase their LLA.
4 US versus Non-US banks
The US versus non-US analysis uses bank-specific data obtained from the
BankScope database during 1993–2000. Although BankScope provides basic
bank information on over 7,500 banks per year over the sample period, it does not
have consistent information on loan loss reserves and non-performing loans. We
select a group of banks from different nations that have reported clean and




The basic equation for the multi-country comparison is based on equation (3.2)
with two modifications. First, the expected levels of capital and earnings may vary
by country. Thus, instead of the levels of capital and earnings ratios, these
variables are measured as deviations from their respective national averages
during the sample period. Second, country fixed effects are also added. Thus, the
equation to be estimated is:
it it 1 it 1 1
it 2 1 t , i 1 it 3 it 3 it 2 1 it
Y C
DRETN DER LOAN NCO NPL LLA
     




                                                
8 See Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993, 1999) for a discussion of how Canadian banks masked their
insolvency in the 1930s.
9 The use of the lagged equity capital ratio requires that first year, 1993, be dropped from the
sample.15
where:
NPLit = the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets as of time t,
NCOit = the ratio of net charge-offs over year t to total assets at time t,
LOANit = the ratio of total loans to total assets at time t,
ERi,t–1 = the equity to assets ratio for bank i as of the end of the prior year, and
Eli(ER) = the average value of ERi,t–1 for all banks in the sample that
headquartered in the same country as bank i, country l, over 1993–2000,
DERi,t–1 = the difference between the value of ERi,t–1 for banking organization i
and the average value of ERi,t–1 for all banks in the sample that are headquartered
in the same country as bank i during 1993–2000,
RETNi,t = the ratio of net income before taxes and loan loss provisions to total
assets for bank i in period t,
Eli(RETN) = the average value of RETN for all banks in the sample that
headquartered in the same country as bank i, country l, over 1993–2000, and
DRETNi,t = the difference between the value of ROAi,t for bank i and the average
value of ROAi,t for all banks in BankScope that headquartered in the same country
as bank i over the 1993–2000 period.
Equation (4.1) is estimated separately for the US banks and non-US banks. In
order to determine whether observed differences in the two sets of coefficients in
each section are significant, the following regression is estimated with
observations where the separate samples are pooled:
t in t , i 1 in t , 1 1 in t , i 2
in 1 t , i 1 in t , i 3 in t , i 3
in it 2 in 1 t , i 1 t , i , 1 1
t , i 2 1 t , i 1 t , i 3 t , i 3 t , i 2 1 it
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SBin = sample binary variable equal to 1 if bank i is from sample n (US and
developed countries in their respective models) and 0 otherwise.
The coefficients αα1, αα2, αα3, ββ1 and ββ2 represent the difference between the
coefficients from the two samples and the statistical significance of these
coefficients is a test of whether statistical differences exist.16
4.2 Results: US banks versus non-US banks
The 2620 US bank observations in the sample differ from the 871 observations
taken from the rest of the world along every dimension according to Table 1. The
second and third columns in Table 1 give the mean and standard deviation for the
US sample. The next two columns give the same statistics for the non-US sample
with the the last column gives the differences in means and notes which
differences are statistically significant at the 5% level, using SAS’s Proc TTest
(see SAS (1999)) without assuming equal variances.
The US banks’ mean assets of $17. billion are statistically significantly less
than the non-US sample of $48 billion. US banks reported statistically
significantly smaller loan loss problems than their non-US counterparts in all
three measures of loan problems: the LLA to asset ratio, nonperforming loans to
asset ratio and the ratio of net charge-offs to assets. The difference in non-
performing loans is especially notable with the US ratio of 0.0050 less than one-
quarter of the non-US ratio of 0.0236. The US banks also recorded substantially
higher pre-tax, pre-loan loss provision earnings and a higher equity capital to asset
ratio.
The estimation results also show many statistically significant differences
between the US and the non-US samples. The results of estimating the model for
the US (second and third columns in Table 2) show that all of the coefficients on
the explanatory variables are statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitudes of
the coefficients for the control variables also appear to be plausible. US banks
increased their LLA by approximately $15 for every $100 of non-performing
loans, $18 for every $100 of charge-offs and $1 for every $100 of loans. The
positive and significant coefficient on the deviation from average pre-tax, pre-
provision earnings suggests that US banks with relatively low earnings maintained
a smaller LLA than banks with higher earnings. The coefficient on the deviation
of the lagged capital ratio from the average capital ratio has a negative sign and is
marginally significant (10% level) for US banks.  This negative coefficient is
consistent with high charter value banks having a higher target equity capital ratio
and with banks with the lowest capital having the most hidden loan losses hidden
from prior periods.
The results for the non-US sample under the columns labeled “Regression 2.”
The coefficients on two variables are significant and both have the predicted sign:
the non-performing loan ratio and the deviation from their respective country’s
average pre-tax, pre-provision earnings.
The last two columns of Table 2 present the results of combining the
estimation of the two models to determine if the differences between the
coefficient estimates are statistically significant. The results suggest that all of the
differences in coefficient estimates between the US and non-US banks are17
significant except the deviation from their country’s average capital ratio
(DERt–1·DUMMY). The differences in coefficients in the coefficients on non-
performing loans may merely reflect differences in expected losses for those loans
no longer being repaid on schedule. Not only is the difference in coefficients on
charge-offs significant, the coefficient on charge-offs is insignificantly different
from zero in the non-US sample. This suggests that banks in the rest of the world
are not rebuilding their LLA in response to loan charge-offs. The coefficient on
loans for the non-US sample is also insignificantly different from zero and
significantly less than the US value. This suggests that, on average, banks in the
rest of the world are not increasing their allowance to reflect as yet unidentified
problems in their loan portfolio.
The difference between the coefficient on US banks’ deviation from their
average pre-tax, pre-provision earnings and the coefficient for the rest of the
world’s deviations (DRETNt·DUMMY) is significantly negative. This result
suggests that the allowance is more sensitive to earnings in the rest of the world
sample.
5 Japan and Canada versus the US
The procedure for comparing Japan and Canada with the US is similar to that used
above. One difference is that the use of deviations from national averages for
earnings and capital are unnecessary, as separate explanatory variables exist for
each country. Thus, the variable DRETNi,t is replaced by the variable RETNi,t and
the variable DERi,t–1 is replaced by ERi,t–1. A second difference is that the country
fixed effects variables are dropped.
5.1 Japan
Japanese banks suffered from three interrelated problems during the 1990s that
may have influenced their loan loss accounting. First, the Japanese economy
entered a prolonged period of weak economic growth and declining asset values
which started with the decline in the stock market in 1989 and was apparent in
land prices beginning in 1992 (Kanaya and Woo, 2000). This ongoing economic
weakness has led to sharp reductions in the credit quality of the banks’ loan
portfolios and in accounting earnings. Earnings problems have, in turn, led to
problems in meeting book value based supervisory capital adequacy standards.
Kanaya and Woo (2000) further suggest that corporate governance problems at
Japanese banks, especially ownership of bank stock by corporate borrowers,
created an incentive for banks to forbear on weak credits. This incentive was18
magnified by the difficulty many banks had in complying with supervisory capital
adequacy standards. The end result was an increase in the levels of weak loans on
the bank’s books.
This economic weakness may have implications for Japanese banks’ reported
non-performing loans and LLA. Supervisory forbearance on potential problem
loans may have allowed the banks to avoid recognizing the losses. Hoshi and
Kashyap (2000) note that private sector analysts claim that official figures
understate the amount of problem loans. They also note changes in accounting
definitions in 1996, 1998 and 1999 that tightened Japanese reporting standards led
to large increases in reported non-performing loans.
10
The impact of such understatement on the model’s estimates is unclear. To the
extent that Japanese banks increase their LLA at the same percentage of non-
performing loans throughout the period, the understatement may have no impact.
Alternatively, if banks are only recognizing the worst of their bad loans, these
loans may have higher expected loss given default, which may result in a larger
coefficient on the non-performing loan ratio. A second possibility is that Japanese
banks reduced their reported LLA by setting aside a smaller portion of their non-
performing loans in their LLA. If true, this would reduce the coefficient on non-
performing loans in the Japanese bank model.
11
Japanese loan loss accounting also may have been influenced by several
special factors. Genay (1998) points out that Japan’s total loan loss reserves may
be split into three categories with differing regulations: general reserves, specific
reserves and foreign loan reserves.  In a survey of the Japanese banking crisis,
Kanaya and Woo (2000) point out that the general reserves for Japanese banks
after 1964 were limited to the maximum of their own historical experience or to a
reference level determined by tax authorities. Japanese banks had historically used
the reference level because it had exceeded their historical experience. This
reference level was 0.3% of loans in 1989 and most banks continued to use this
level through the 1990s even though their actual experience was worse according
to Kanaya and Woo (2000). Genay (1998) says that specific reserves were created
for that part of loans deemed irrecoverable, but that only 50 percent was tax
deductible. Banks could reserve more than the tax-deductible amount with
approval from the Ministry of Finance. The third type of reserve for foreign loans
was equal to 35 percent of loans to specific countries where transfer risk may have
been material, but only one percent of the loan balance was tax deductible. These
various rules may have provided an additional incentive for Japanese banks to
                                                
10 Kanaya and Woo (2000) also note changes in the rules for consolidating related companies in
December 1988 that reduced the bank’s ability to hide problem loans.
11 Another possibility would be that the non-performing loans that were reported do have a higher
loss given default, but that the banks continue to use the same expected loss rate in calculating
their loan loss allowance.19
minimize their LLA until 1998. The 1998 implementation of prompt corrective
action in Japan gave banks a mandate to make adequate provisions based on self-
assessment according to Genay (1998).
Japanese banks also follow different loan charge-off policies than US banks
according to Genay (1998). US banks are supposed to charge-off loans when the
extent and timing of the losses can be determined. Japanese banks can only charge
off loans when the debtor is in bankruptcy and the Ministry of Finance gives its
approval.
As Japanese banks recognized loan losses, they may also have recognized
offsetting capital gains on their holdings of bonds, land and stock during the
1990s to boost reported capital ratios. Banks were allowed to count portion of
unrecognized capital gains in their capital ratios. However, Kanaya and Woo
(2000) note that by realizing capital gains at the same time they were writing off
loans, the banks could fully offset the impact of increased charge-offs and
reserves on their tier 1 equity capital. The result may be a larger positive
coefficient on pre-tax, pre-provision income empirical model.
5.1.1 Descriptive data
Although Japanese banks may have been trying to understate the magnitude of
their bad loan problems, Table 3 suggests that problem loans were a more serious
problem for Japanese banks than for the US banks. All three measures of loan
problems – loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing loan ratio, and charge-off ratio
– are significantly higher for Japanese banks than for US banks despite Japanese
accounting rules that may have discouraged recognition of problem loans.
Moreover, the differences are economically large. The loan loss reserve ratio for
Japanese banks is only 10% higher than for the US sample, (0.0113 for Japan
versus 0.0101 for the US), but the Japanese nonperforming loan ratio is triple the
US ratio, and the charge-off ratio is almost double the US level.
Japanese banks also had statistically and economically significantly lower
returns and equity capital ratios. Both ratios are less than one-half the value of US
banks.
5.1.2 Estimation results
The coefficients on all of the explanatory variables for the US sample except the
lagged equity capital ratio are statistically significant with the correct sign in
Table 4. All of the coefficients on the explanatory variables for the Japanese
banks are significant except for the coefficient on the charge-off ratio. The
discussion of Japanese tax rules suggests that the coefficient on the loan ratio20
variable might be statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.003. However, the
estimated coefficient is substantially larger, at 0.0115.
The coefficients on three of the five difference variables (such as
NCt·DUMMY) are statistically significant. One of the significant differences is
that US banks increased their LLA in response to higher charge-offs whereas
Japanese banks reduced their reserves by a statistically insignificant amount. This
weak relationship between charge-offs and reserves in Japan may reflect the
greater difficulty in charging off loans in Japan.
The second significant difference is that the coefficient on pre-tax, pre-
provision earnings is statistically significantly higher for Japanese banks than for
the sample of US banks. Moreover, the difference is economically significant,
with the US coefficient of 0.1078 versus the coefficient for Japanese banks of
0.4179. The large coefficient may reflect greater willingness on the part of
Japanese banks to recognize losses when they have higher earnings. However, it
could also be that Japanese banks were timing their recognition of capital gains to
occur in years where they were increasing their LLA.
12,13
The last significant difference is that the coefficient on the lagged equity
capital ratio is significantly negative for Japanese banks, but insignificantly
positive for US banks Further, the coefficient DERt–1·DUMMY is significant. The
negative coefficient on Japanese banks may reflect differences in target capital
ratios or the possibility that banks with lower capital having larger losses.
The value of the coefficient on non-performing loans is 0.2042 for the
Japanese samples and the difference with the US (NPLt·DUMMY) is not
significant. While only suggestive, this is not what one would expect if Japanese
banks thought their non-performing loans were the worst of the worst loans, ones
on which they were likely to have little or no recovery. Rather one might have
expected a much larger coefficient and for the difference in coefficients with the
US to be statistically significant.
                                                
12 As a test of whether the results were being driven by outliers, we re-estimated the equations
deleting the banks in the top quarter of earnings and then re-estimated the equation deleting the top
quarter in loan loss allowance. The coefficient on earnings may be substantially smaller in one or
both regressions if the high positive coefficient were solely due to banks recognizing large loan
losses and offsetting these losses with large securities gains. The coefficient does drop somewhat
in magnitude but it remains substantially larger than the comparable coefficient for the US sample.
13 Shrieves and Dahl (2003) also examine earnings management by Japanese banks over the 1989–
1996 period. They find evidence that banks in their sample recognize greater securities gains when
they also report higher provisions in a simultaneous-equations framework. One important
limitation of their results is that they by using data back to 1989, they lack any information on
non-performing loans.21
5.2 Canada
While Japanese and US banks followed different paths in the 1990s, Canadian and
US banks followed broadly similar paths. The early 1990s were marked by
economic weakness and high loan losses. However, banks were able to benefit
from the strong economic conditions later in the 1990s with lower loan losses and
higher earnings.
Canadian loan loss accounting has a number of similarities to US loan loss
accounting. Like the US, an independent body, the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accounts, sets Canadian accounting principles. The Canadian and US
principles are similar except that the Canadian standards distinguish between
specific and a general allowances. Like the US, Canadian banks can be forced to
increase their LLA by their supervisor, the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (OSFI).
14 Also like the US, the equity analysts following
large Canadian banks routinely comment on the adequacy of banks’ LLA.
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics
The evidence on the average loan quality of the two samples is mixed according
to Table 5. US banks have a significantly higher loan loss reserve ratio but a
significantly lower non-performing loan ratio. The difference in the best measure
of loan problems over the period, the charge-off ratio, is statistically and
economically insignificant. The pre-tax, pre-provision earnings of US banks are
significantly greater than that of Canadian banks and US banks also have a higher
Tier 1 capital to total assets ratio.
15
                                                
14 Some of the Canadian banks report that they made changes in response changes in Canadian
GAAP in 1996. For example, the Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank) reported “Under these
guidelines, there is a requirement to measure impairment by discounting the expected future cash
flows associated with the impaired loan at the effective interest rate inherent in the loan at the date
of impairment.” The number of pre-1996 observations from Canada is too small to allow
estimation of the effect of these changes.
15 The primary difference between the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio and the equity to capital ratio
is that the tier one ratio uses risk weighted exposure rather than total assets. Canadian, US and
many other bank supervisors used the tier 1 ratio rather than the equity capital ratio during the
1990s. This ratio was not used in the other models because more of the banks in Bank Scope
report equity and assets than report their tier 1 capital ratio.22
5.2.2 Estimation results
The coefficient estimates for the sample of US, Canadian and combined samples
are presented in Table 6. The coefficients on three variables (the non-performing
loan ratio, the charge-off ratio, and the pre-tax, pre-provision earnings) are
significant with the expected signs for the US banks. Only the coefficient on the
non-performing loan ratio s significant for the Canadian banks,. Unlike the results
of Naciri (2002), the results in Table 6 reject the hypothesis that Canadian banks
are using loan loss accounting to manage earnings. The differences in findings
could be due to a either difference in sample periods, Naciri uses data from 1980
to 1996, or a difference in the methodology.
16
Some of the differences in coefficients between the two samples are
economically large, however, given the imprecision of the coefficient estimates,
none of the differences are statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject that the
US and Canadian banks are following a similar approach to their loan loss
accounting.
6 Conclusion
How banks account for their impaired loans has a potentially large impact on their
reported earnings and capital. While many studies have examined the loan loss
accounting of US banks, banks outside the US have received much less attention.
This paper uses data from the BankScope database, the Compustat database and
from Canadian banks financial statements to provide empirical evidence on loan
loss accounting in other countries.
The results suggest that while banks outside the US share many similarities
with US banks, they also differ in some important ways. An important, albeit not
surprising, similarity is that the loan loss reserve ratio in all samples is
significantly related to the non-performing loan ratio. While the coefficients on
this ratio vary across the samples, the differences may merely reflect cross-
                                                
16 One hypothesis that could explain the difference in results is that Canadian banks were focused
on rebuilding their tier 1 capital ratios early in the period, and focused on earnings management
only after their tier 1 capital approached the banks’ target levels. In order to check this possibility,
we reran the regressions estimating a set of earnings and capital coefficients for banks below some
presumed target level and coefficients for banks above some presumed target level. Some evidence
was found supporting the existence of a capital target at low capital levels and earnings targets at
higher capital target levels when we arbitrarily set the tier 1 capital target at 9 percent. The
coefficient on capital is positive and marginally significant (10 percent) for banks below the 9
percent target, the coefficient on earnings is positive and marginally significant for banks above
the target. The other earnings and the other capital coefficients are both insignificant.23
country differences in expected losses on non-performing loans. However, the
results for the other two “non-discretionary” explanatory variables are different
between the US and non-US samples. The loan charge-off ratio is statistically
significant for every sample of US banks and statistically insignificant for all non-
US samples. The loan to asset ratio is significant for two of the three US samples
but never significant for the non-US samples. This raises the question of whether
these variables proxy for non-discretionary determinants of loan loss reserves in
the US sample. Perhaps these are better seen as measures of US banks desire to
maintain some discretionary minimum ratios of loan loss reserves to loans.
Alternatively, these variables may not be the best proxies for underlying non-
discretionary determinants of the loan loss reserve for banks outside the US.
In terms of the discretionary determinants of the loan loss reserve, the
coefficients on the pre-tax pre-provision earnings ratio are generally significant
with a positive sign, with the exception of the Canadian bank sample. The
coefficients on the earnings ratio are significantly lower for US banks than for the
non-US bank sample, and for the Japanese bank sample. These differences may
reflect differences in the financial market benefits of managing earnings or in the
flexibility that management has to manage earnings (ie, the cost of managing
earnings). However, in at least some cases, the results may also reflect banks’
determination to artificially boost reported net income, such as by realizing capital
gains, in those periods where they need to increase their LLA.
The coefficients on the lagged measures of capital adequacy, equity capital to
assets and tier 1 risk-based ratio, are rarely significant with the correct sign. These
coefficients are usually insignificant, but when significant they are negative rather
than positive. These results suggest the need to better model banks’ target capital
ratios.
Finally, the non-US samples generally produce different results from the US,
suggesting that research on loan loss accounting practices by banks outside the US
may add not only to our insight about accounting outside the US but also
accounting practices in the US. However, this study also illustrates the limits of
using the same model for the US and non-US banks. The next logical place for
research is more in-depth analysis that takes account of special factors and
regulatory practices in individual countries.24
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